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Random numbers are a fundamental ingredient for many applications including simulation, mod-
elling and cryptography. Sound random numbers should be independent and uniformly distributed.
Moreover, for cryptographic applications they should also be unpredictable. We demonstrate a
real-time self-testing source independent quantum random number generator (QRNG) that uses
squeezed light as source. We generate secure random numbers by measuring the quadratures of the
electromagnetic field without making any assumptions on the source; only the detection device is
trusted. We use a homodyne detection to alternatively measure the Qˆ and Pˆ conjugate quadratures
of our source. Using the entropic uncertainty relation, measurements on Pˆ allows us to estimate
a bound on the min-entropy of Qˆ conditioned on any classical or quantum side information that a
malicious eavesdropper may detain. This bound gives the minimum number of secure bits we can
extract from the Qˆ measurement. We discuss the performance of different estimators for this bound.
We operate this QRNG with a squeezed state and we compare its performance with a QRNG using
thermal states. The real-time bit rate was 8.2 kb/s when using the squeezed source and between
5.2–7.2 kb/s when the thermal state source was used.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are used as a resource for many
application such as statistical analysis, numerical sim-
ulation, encryption and communication protocols. Ran-
dom numbers must satisfy three main requirements: they
must be uniformly distributed, independent and unpre-
dictable. Pseudo random numbers are generated with
a computer via algorithmic routines from a seed. They
have the advantage of being easy to implement and fast,
but they are intrinsically not secure due to their deter-
ministic generation [1] and some commonly used pseudo
random number generators (PRNG) have been shown to
be unsecure [2]. Their randomness can also be flawed [3]
which can lead to errors in simulations [4, 5]. Physi-
cal random number generators use a stochastic physical
process as the source of randomness [6, 7]. They are
slower than PRNGs but can still achieve very high gen-
eration rate and has been used as a seed for PRNGs. For
random number generators based on classical systems,
the randomness usually originate as lack of knowledge
on the initial state of the system, in which case the se-
curity relies on the assumption that no one has a better
knowledge of this original state. Quantum systems on
the other hand [8] offer an interesting alternative source
of randomness as measurement outcomes on such sys-
tems are intrinsically random due to Born’s rule [9]. It
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is then possible to create a long-term stable [10], fast
quantum random number generator (QRNG) [11–13], in
a self testing fashion [14], or even on a mobile phone [15].
However the measurement outcomes may still be corre-
lated with another party [16]. This is the case when-
ever the source of randomness is in a mixed state. Even
in that case, it is still possible to exploit non-local Bell
state measurement [17, 18] to extract true random num-
bers without any assumption on the source of random-
ness or the measurement device [19–23]. However these
implementation are still very slow with rates around few
tens of bits per second. In a similar fashion, genera-
tion protocols using light emitted from distant cosmic
sources were recently proposed and demonstrated [24–
26]. As a faster alternative one can implement a semi
device independent QRNG by assuming only either the
source [27] or the detection [28–32] device is trusted. In a
source independent quantum random number generator
(SI-QRNG), the source of randomness can be arbitrary
and controlled by an adversarial party; yet it can still
yield secure random numbers. Roughly speaking, the
principle of SI-QRNG is that, by switching between dif-
ferent measurement basis, one is able to assess the purity
of the source, which can in turn set a bound on its ex-
tractable randomness. This can be formalized rigorously
using the entropic uncertainty relation [33] which was
first introduced in [34].
SI-QRNG based on the entropic uncertainty relation
have already been demonstrated in both discrete [28]
and continuous variables [30]. However, in these proof
of principle experiments, the randomness estimation was
always evaluated in post processing after collecting all
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2the raw data. Here we implement a continuous variable
SI-QRNG where all processing is done in real-time. Ad-
ditionally, we dynamically switch between two measure-
ment basis to alternate between a check measurement and
a random-data measurement. The SI-QRNG is self test-
ing and changes its output secure bit rate depending on
the check measurement data. Although theoretical pro-
posal for using squeezed states as sources of entropy for
a QRNG have been suggested [30, 35], we report the first
experimental use of squeezed states as an entropy source
for a QRNG.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we
present the protocol and experimental details for gener-
ating random numbers. The protocol requires estimat-
ing a lower bound to the conditional min-entropy. In
section III, we present the real-time entropy estimation
procedure and the statistics of the random numbers gen-
erated. Due to finite sample size, we find that the eval-
uated conditional min-entropy is positively biased which
can lead to an overestimation of the randomness rate. To
mitigate this, we propose and discuss other more robust
estimators in section IV. Finally, we conclude in section V
with a discussion of several ways for extending the work
in this paper as well as a summary of our work.
II. PROTOCOL AND EXPERIMENT
In a SI-QRNG, we are attempting to generate se-
cure random numbers without having to trust the source
state. This is possible by performing trusted measure-
ments on two non-commuting observables. Our experi-
ment was performed on continuous variable light fields,
and the observables measured are the field quadratures Qˆ
and Pˆ . By measuring the check quadrature Pˆ , we put a
bound on how much secure randomness can be extracted
on the orthogonal random-data quadrature Qˆ. In the
following, we provide the details on how a bound on the
random-data measurements can be calculated.
A. Randomness bound from conditional
min-entropy
In our experiment, even though the quadrature observ-
able has a continuous degree of freedom, the data that is
recorded is ultimately discrete. The discretization size is
determined by the finite resolution of the digitizer. This
finite resolution implies that we do not measure the ob-
servables Qˆ and Pˆ , but rather their discretized counter-
parts. Formally we measure a subsection of the positive-
operator valued measures (POVM)
{
Qˆkδq
}
corresponding
to k ∈ [−m2 , m2 − 1], where Qˆkδq = ∫Ikδq dq |q〉 〈q| and
Ikδq =

(−∞, (k + 12 )δq) for k = −m2[
(k − 12 )δq, (k + 12 )δq
)
for − m2 < k < m2 − 1[
(k − 12 )δq,∞
)
for k = m2 − 1 .
The even integer m denotes the total number of bins,
the index k enumerates the outcomes and δq > 0 spec-
ifies the precision of the measurement. The measure-
ment outcomes qk on state ρA, appear with probability
p(qk) = Tr[ρAQˆkδq] and are stored in a classical register
Qδq.
When measuring the discretized quadrature Qˆδq, the
maximum amount of secure extractable randomness from
a single shot measurement of Qδq on a state ρ is given
by [16, 36–40]
rsec(Qδq|E)ρ = Hmin(Qδq|E)ρ − 2 log2
1

, (1)
where  is the security parameter and Hmin(Qδq|E) is the
conditional min-entropy of Qδq [41]. The protocol is then
said to be -secure, which means that the probability of
distinguishing the output from a truly uniform indepen-
dent distribution is smaller than 12 (1+) [40]. The condi-
tional min-entropy Hmin(Qδq|E) is defined as [37, 38, 42]
Hmin(Qδq|E)ρQE = − log2 max{Eˆk}
∑
k
p(qk)Tr[Eˆkρ
k
E ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
pguess({Eˆk})
, (2)
where ρQE =
∑
k p(qk) |k〉A 〈k| ⊗ ρkE is the collective
classical-quantum state after measurement on system A.
ρkE is the state of system E conditioned on measure-
ment k by A, and {Eˆk} is a POVM on system E. The
quantity pguess({Eˆk}) is the average probability for an
adversary Eve to correctly guess the index k using a
measurement strategy {Eˆk}. The maximization on the
POVM {Eˆk} corresponds to finding the best measure-
ment strategy Eve might apply to guess the index k on
the post-measurement state ρQE . The amount of secure
randomness is then the smallest conditional min-entropy
for states ρQE consistent with Alice’s state ρA. If the
state ρA is pure, this implies that A and E are inde-
pendent: ρAE = ρA ⊗ ρE , in which case the conditional
min-entropy reduces to the classical unconditioned min-
entropy
Hmin(Qδq) = − log2 max
k
{p(qk)} . (3)
Here Eve’s best guessing strategy is to guess the most
likely index k everytime. For any state, Hmin(Qδq) ≥
Hmin(Qδq|E) and the difference can be seen as the
amount of side information detained by Eve. To com-
pute the exact value of Hmin(Qδq|E)ρQE in (2), one needs
to know ρQE . Since Alice does not have access to E,
she would need to perform a complete tomography of
ρA to find all compatible states ρQE . This is tedious
for an infinite dimensional system. Instead, one can
bound Hmin(Qδq|E) by the max-entropy of the conjugate
quadrature Hmax(Pδp) using the entropic uncertainty re-
lation (EUR) [33, 34, 43–48]. This leads to a lower bound
Hlow:
Hmin(Qδq|E) ≥ Hlow(Pδp) := −Hmax(Pδp)−log2 c(δq, δp)
(4)
3Figure 1: Scheme and protocol of the SI-QRNG. A local oscillator whose phase is locked to measure the check quadra-
ture is interfered with an untrusted entropy source which can be a squeezed, thermal or some unknown state. The two
output beams are detected and the resulting photocurrents are subtracted. From this homodyne measurement, the
min-entropy on the random-data quadrature is estimated. The phase lock then switches to the orthogonal random-
data quadrature and the same homodyne measurement is performed. The raw random numbers are hashed according
to the previous min-entropy estimation. Some of the secure random bits obtained in this way are used to determine
when the next lock switch will happen. The check quadrature is measured randomly and on average once every ten
runs.
where the max entropy is defined as
Hmax(Pδp) = 2 log2
∑
k
√
p(pk) . (5)
The classical unconditioned max and min entropies are
equivalent to the Rényi entropies [49] of order 12 and ∞
respectively. Additionally,
c(δq, δp) =
1
4pi
δqδpS
(1)
0
(
1,
δqδp
8
)2
(6)
is a measure of the incompatibility between the two mea-
surements and S(1)0 is the 0th radial prolate spheroidal
wave function of the first kind [50]. This wavefunction
comes about by considering the maximum overlap be-
tween the eigenstates of Qˆδq and Pˆδp and holds for states
ρA that has no support in the two extreme bins because
those extreme bins have width larger than δq. This re-
quirement correspond to bounding the energy of the in-
put state which is a reasonable assumption. This as-
sumption could be verified by including an energy mea-
surement as part of the protocol [51, 52]. In our real-time
demonstration, we just limit the excursion of the state
by aborting the protocol when one of the extreme bins is
populated.
The bound is unconditional; it is a function of Pδq
only and is independent of E. We use the convention
where the vacuum state has a quadrature variance of 1.
The Pˆ quadrature is used as the check quadrature that
estimates the amount of randomness extractable in the
measurement on the conjugate Qˆ which is the random-
data quadrature.
B. Experimental details
As shown in Fig.1, the experimental set-up has two
parts. The fist part is an untrusted entropy source which
consists of a quantum state ρA that may be mixed and
correlated to a malicious party E: ρA = TrE(ρAE). We
operated the device on two sources, a squeezed state and
a thermal state. A shot-noise limited 1064 nm Nd:YAG
continuous wave laser provides the laser source for this
experiment. A portion of the 1064 nm light is frequency
doubled to provide a pump field at 532 nm. Both fields
undergo spatial and frequency filtering to provide shot-
noise limited light at the sideband frequencies above 2
MHz. The thermal state was generated with an am-
plitude and phase electro-optic modulators on which we
send a white noise electronic signal from two indepen-
dent function generators. By varing the amplitudes of
the noise to the modulators, we varied the variance of
this thermal state to see the effect on the secure bit rate.
The squeezed state with around 3 dB of squeezing was
generated with a seeded doubly resonant optical para-
metric amplifier in a bow-tie geometry. Details on the
squeezed state generation can be found in [53].
The second part of the set-up is a trusted measure-
ment device which consists of a homodyne detector that
can measure one of two conjugate quadratures Qˆ and Pˆ
on the state ρA by locking the phase of a local oscillator
(LO) using amplitude or phase modulation. The sub-
tracted current is then mixed down and filtered in the 13
to 17 MHz band before being digitized overm = 212 bins.
The measurement device switches randomly between two
4measurement states: check measurements and random-
data measurements. On average, a check measurement
was performed once every ten measurement cycles.
In the check measurement state, three measurement
steps are performed. In the first step, the LO and sig-
nal beams are blocked using servo-controlled beam-blocks
and the electronic dark noise is recorded. In the second
step, the signal beam is blocked, while the LO is un-
blocked. This allows us to record the vacuum shot noise.
In the third step, both signal and LO beams are un-
blocked; the LO is locked to Pˆ and the check data is
recorded. The data is then normalized according to the
shot noise corrected of dark noise σ2corrected =
σ2measured
σ2shot−σ2dark
.
In this way, all electronic noise will be accounted as im-
purity on ρA.
From the check data, we evaluated the probabilities
p(pk) using the frequentist estimator and Hmax(Pδp) us-
ing eqn (5). For each evaluation, the bin size δp is recal-
culated, in units of shot noise, using the corrected shot
noise measurement. The corresponding value of c(δq, δp)
is then evaluated using a pre-calculated polynomial ap-
proximation. In the experiment, we had an average
δq = (14.45±0.09)×10−3 and δq = (15.56±0.09)×10−3
for the thermal state and squeezed state run respectively.
The bound Hlow(Pδp) is then estimated using (4) and
stored in the computer for use in the random-data mea-
surement stage.
In the random-data measurement state, both the sig-
nal and LO beams are unblocked. The LO phase is locked
to Qˆ, and the raw data is recorded. It is then normal-
ized according to the shot noise corrected of dark noise
taken from the previous check measurement. In order to
eliminate Eve’s information, we apply the Toeplitz ma-
trix hashing algorithm [54] on the raw data to obtain the
secure random data. The length of the Toeplitz matrix is
determined by the randomness bound evaluated in check
stage. A few bits of the hashed random numbers are used
to determine whether the next stage will be a check or
random-data measurement stage.
For both check and random-data measurements, the
number of measurements points collected was n = 16000.
In our implementation, to avoid slowing down the proto-
col, the random Toeplitz matrix was generated once at
the start of the experiment using a trusted QRNG [12]
source. However, for the hashing to be fully secure, a
new hashing function randomly chosen from a family
of two-universal hashing functions should be used every
time [40, 55, 56]. This is so that Eve does not have knowl-
edge of the hash function prior to preparing the state
such that she cannot implement deception strategies tai-
lored to the hashing function. For monitoring purposes,
we also evaluated Hmin(Qδq) using the frequentist esti-
mator. We also check that the homodyne detection was
never saturated. If a saturation event is ever detected,
the protocol will abort immediately.
III. RESULTS AND ESTIMATION ERROR
ANALYSIS
As mentioned before, the QRNG was operated with
two different sources; a Pˆ -squeezed state and a thermal
state. In order to generate secure randomness, we use the
bound provided by Hlow(Pδp) in eq (4). In order to apply
this bound, we need to know the value of Hmax(Pδp). In
subsection IIIA, we present the real-time experimental
result where the frequentist estimator for Hmax(Pδp) was
used. In subsection III B, we show that this estimator is
biased which may compromise the security of the QRNG.
A. Real time entropy estimation
In the experiment, the entropies are calculated in real
time using the frequentists estimator. After measuring
n = 16000 data points, and binning the outcomes into m
bins, the frequentist estimators are given by
H freqmin (~n) = − log2
maxk{nk}
n
, (7)
H freqmax(~n) = 2 log2
m∑
k=1
√
nk
n
(8)
where nk denotes the number of outcomes in the
k-th bin and ~n = (n1, n2, . . . , nm). The entropy
bounds H freqlow (Pδp) and the unconditioned classical en-
tropy H freqmin (Qδq) from the experiments are recorded for
thermal and squeezed state and these are presented as the
points in Figs. 2a and 2b. In the same figures, we also plot
simulation results Hsimlow (Pδq) and H
sim
min(Qδq) obtained by
sampling n points from a perfect Gaussian distribution.
These simulations are repeated 1000 times to estimate
the mean and standard deviation of the estimated en-
tropy bound. Finally, the theoretical values we would
expect for a perfect discretized Gaussian distribution
p(pk) =
1
2
erf
(
pk +
δp
2√
2σ
)
− 1
2
erf
(
pk − δp2√
2σ
)
(9)
are plotted as solid lines Hthlow(Pδq) and H
th
min(Qδq).
For the squeezed state simulation results, the impu-
rity of the squeezed state was accounted for by inferring
the amount of loss on the state from the two quadrature
variance measurement. This was estimated to be 33%.
This is the reason why the min-entropy and the bound
are not equal; they can only be equal for a pure state.
Figure 2b shows that higher squeezing give rise to more
extractable randomness. Indeed, measuring squeezing on
one quadrature guarantees increased noise on the conju-
gate anti-squeezed quadrature. Unlike in the thermal
noise case, this noise is not correlated to another sys-
tem. For example having 5 dB squeezing on the source
increases the entropy rate by around 10% compared to
vacuum. Therefore using a squeezed state as an entropy
5Figure 2: Entropy bound and classical min-entropy for (a) a thermal state with different values of noise and (b) a
Pˆ -squeezed state with 33% loss. The red solid lines show the theoretical unconditioned min entropy of the random-
data quadrature Qˆ. This gives the extractable randomness if the source is trusted. The blue solid lines show the
theoretical bound to the conditional min-entropy Hmin(Q|E) obtained by the entropic uncertainty relation. This
gives the secure extractable randomness for an untrusted source. The blue and red points show the corresponding
experimental data calculated in real-time using a frequentist estimator on data samples of length n = 16000. For
most values of squeezing, we find that H freqlow > H
freq
min which would be in violation of the EUR (eqn 4). This apparent
violation arises due to a bias in the frequentist estimators. Dashed lines show the corresponding simulation results
and the shaded area corresponds to a 5 standard deviation uncertainty region.
source can improve the QRNG bit rate, especially with
broadband squeezing. For the squeezed state run the bit
rate was 8.2 kb/s.
The thermal state results in Fig. 2a illustrate the dif-
ference between the conditioned and unconditioned min-
entropy. Indeed a thermal state can be purified by a
two-mode squeezed state such that the outcome of a
measurement on that state may well be correlated to
a mode detained by Eve. This amount of quantum or
classical side information is the difference between the
min-entropy, which quantifies the entropy of the mea-
surement distribution, and the conditional min-entropy
which quantifies the entropy given any possible side in-
formation. For a thermal state, the higher the variance
the higher the min-entropy which reflects the apparent
random noise in quadrature measurement, yet the lower
the conditioned min-entropy because the state could be
a two-mode squeezed state with higher correlations. For
the thermal state run, the bit rate varied between 5.2
kb/s for the state with higher variance to 7.2 kb/s for
the state with lower variance.
We tested a collection of random numbers obtained
from both the thermal and squeezed states with the NIST
statistical test suite [57]. The results are shown in Fig. 3.
B. Bias of the frequentist estimator
We see in Figs. 2a and 2b that there is a discrepancy
between the theoretical bound Hthlow(Pδp) and H
th
min(Qδq)
calculated for a Gaussian state and the experimental
data. To analyse this we ran a simulation by sampling
a pure Gaussian distribution for different sample size n.
Each simulation was repeated 1000 times. As shown in
Figs. 4a and 4b, we find that the frequentist estimators
H freqlow (Pδp) and H
freq
min (Qδq) are both biased. The mean of
the frequentist estimators do not match the true values
Hthlow(Pδp) and H
th
min(Qδq). This leads to an apparent vio-
lation of the EUR as H freqlow (Pδp) is positively biased while
H freqmin (Qδq) is negatively biased. This bias gets smaller as
the sample size increases. But even for very large sam-
ple size this problem might be present, as it will depend
on the source state considered, as shown in Appendix B.
Moreover if Eve’s state is maximally correlated with ours
then any overestimation of the bound will compromise
the security of the random numbers. One may try to
correct this by using a different estimator for the max-
entropy.
IV. OTHER ESTIMATORS FOR THE
ENTROPY BOUND
Having learned that the frequentist estimator can be
biased, in this section we investigate and compare three
different estimators. These estimators comes with their
own natural confidence interval that we can set.
A. Bayesian estimator
Another class of possible estimators for Hmax are the
Bayesian estimators. To calculate the Bayes estimator of
6Figure 3: Results of NIST statistical test suites obtained
by combining 1000 samples from both the squeezed and
thermal state source. Each sample size is 100 kbits and
the test significance level is α = 0.01. To ‘pass’, the
P -values (uniformity of p-values) should be larger than
0.0001 and the pass proportions should be within the
Clopper–Pearson interval of [0.978724, 0.996273].
an unknown parameter, one has to specify a prior proba-
bility density. This represents our initial belief about the
distribution of the unknown parameter. Here we anal-
yse two estimators for Hmax based on two different pri-
ors. The first is an uninformative prior which makes no
assumption on the underlying probability distribution.
The second assumes the worst case scenario by choosing
a prior peaked around the uniform probability. Decid-
ing which prior to use is a matter of the experimental-
ist’s degree of paranoia. Even though the QRNG device
is source-independent, it is not belief-independent. We
note that using Bayesian estimators bring with it the ad-
ditional advantage of having the posterior estimate as a
natural confidence interval.
1. Bayesian estimator for Hmax with a completely
uninformative prior
The indirect Bayesian estimator with a completely un-
informative uniform prior was developed in [58, 59] and
proposed for source-device-independent QRNG in [28].
It is given by:
Hupmax(~n) = 2 log2
(
Γ(n+m)
Γ(n+m+ 12 )
m∑
k=1
Γ(nk +
3
2 )
Γ(nk + 1)
)
.
(10)
Using this estimator in simulation for a gaussian state in
our experimental conditions, we find that it has a nega-
tive bias which does not lead to a violation of the EUP
(see Fig. 5). If one can check that the distribution is
Gaussian, it is then justifiable to use the Bayesian esti-
mator. In fact, one can go a step further and remove this
bias from the estimator. Otherwise, this negative bias
will lead to a severe underestimation of the secure bit
rate. But a priori the distribution might not be Gaus-
sian and this bias will depend on the distribution and
experimental conditions such as the binning size. We
show in Appendix (B) that in some extreme cases this
bias can still be positive.
2. Bayesian estimator for Hmax with a prior peaked around
the uniform distribution
The Bayesian estimator depends on the chosen prior.
The natural choice of prior is the Dirichlet distribution
since it is the conjugate prior to the multinomial distri-
bution. The Dirichlet distribution parameterised by the
vector ~α is given by
Dir
[
~p; ~α
]
=
Γ
(∑m
j=1 αj
)
∏m
j=1 Γ(αj)
m∏
j=1
p
αj−1
j ,
where pj = p(pj). In order to prevent an under-
estimation of Hmax, it is prudent to assume the worst
case scenario by choosing a prior that is sharply peaked
around the uniform distribution. This is because the uni-
form distribution is the distribution with the maximum
possible Hmax. We subsequently adjust our belief when
presented with the measured data. Such a prior can be
constructed by choosing αj = K for all j
pi(~p) = Dir
[
~p;K
]
(11)
=
Γ(mK)
Γ(K)m
(p1 · · · pm)K−1 . (12)
Here K characterize the peakedness of the prior distribu-
tion. A large value of K will correspond to a distribution
peaked around the uniform distribution, whilst K = 0
will correspond to the frequentist estimator. The Bayes
posterior estimator given the measurement outcomes ~n is
the Dirichlet distribution with parameters ~α = ~n+K [60]
f(~p|~n) = Dir [~p;~n+K] . (13)
7Figure 4: (a) Simulation of the frequentist estimator of the entropy bound for a pure gaussian state. We set
δq = 0.0155607 which was the mean value of δq for the squeezed state runs, and ran the simulation for different
sample size. The dashed line shows the theoretical value of Hlow which gives a lower bound on the conditional min
entropy. Due to the finite sample size, the estimator is positively biased which may lead to erroneously extracting
more keys than is secure. (b) Simulation of the frequentist estimator of the unconditional min entropy with the same
parameters. Due to finite sample size, this estimator is negatively biased which lead to instances where H freqmin < H
freq
low .
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Figure 5: Simulation of the uniform prior Bayesian es-
timator for the entropy bound of a pure gaussian state
with the same parameters as Fig. 4. The estimator is
negatively biased which does not compromise security.
From this posterior distribution, we can arrive at a
Bayesian estimator for Hmax. Alternatively, an indirect
estimator for Hmax which we denote by Hppmax can be ob-
tained by substituting the Bayes posterior mean for the
probabilities ~p
pppj = E [pj |~n] (14)
=
nj +K
n+mK
(15)
into (5). As we shall see in section IVC, with a large K,
this estimator tends to be very conservative.
B. Extremal Variance-based Estimator
Another way to estimate Hmax is by estimating the
variance distribution. Instead of estimating Hmax(Pδp)
from the sampled distribution, we can try to bound it.
We first estimate VP , the variance of Pδp with the unbi-
ased estimator VP = 1n−1
∑n
k=1(pk − p¯)2. We can then
find the distribution that maximizes Hmax for this given
variance. This is similar to the method used in [29] for
bounding the Shannon entropy [61, 62].
We show in Appendix A that given a variance Vp, the
corresponding extremal distribution is given by
p(pk) = C
1(
1 +
(
pk
s
)2)2 (16)
where
C =
∑
j
1(
1 +
(
pk
s
)2)2 (17)
is a normalization constant,
s =
√
1− γVP
γ
(18)
and γ is the solution to the equation∑
k
p2k − VP
(1 + γ(p2k − VP ))2
= 0 . (19)
This distribution is a discretized Student’s t-distribution
with 3 degrees of freedom. Although equation (19) does
not have a closed form solution for γ, one may calculate it
numerically. We can then calculate the extremal variance
8Hlow
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Figure 6: The extremal variance based estimator HEVBlow
obtained by estimating the variance of the check-
quadrature. Shaded area shows 5 standard deviation.
This estimator shows no bias. The dashed line is the
theoretical bound for a Gaussian distribution. The es-
timator is lower because the extremal distribution for
the EVB estimator assumes a discretised Student’s t-
distribution (eqn 16). For sample size above 1000, the
variance of this estimator become small enough so that
the probability of a single shot estimation to be above
Hthlow becomes negligible.
based (EVB) estimator HEVBmax (VP ). This is the extremal
max-entropy consistent with the variance VP . From this
we get an estimate forHEVBlow from eqn (4). This is plotted
in Fig. 6 for a gaussian state with parameters similar to
our experiment.
In these conditions, we see that the EVB estimator
shows no bias, the mean value does not change with
the sample size. Moreover, by construction, the mean
of the EVB estimator for HEVBlow is always smaller than
Hthlow(Pδp). Unlike the frequentist estimators, the EVB
estimator does not over-estimateHthlow. However, because
the EVB estimator uses only the variance instead of the
whole distribution it does not converge toHthlow even when
the sample size is large. It will only converge to Hthlow if
the check-quadrature distribution happens to be the dis-
cretized Student’s t-distribution (16).
We note that here, the theory Hthlow(Pδp) and simula-
tions were computed for Gaussian states. The bias re-
sults will differ for other input state and in some cases
the EVB estimator can still be positively biased. This is
because even though the variance estimator is unbiased,
the max-entropy is a concave function of the variance.
This means that it will have a negative bias. This is
illustrated in Appendix B. However, we can get a con-
fidence interval on the variance from the sampled data
and from this we can arrive at a confident estimate for
the max-entropy.
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Figure 7: Comparison between frequentist, Bayes and
EVB estimators for Hlow with finite statistics for the
vacuum state. For the Bayesian estimator with peaked
prior, K was set to 100. Each simulation was repeated
100 times to obtain the estimator mean and standard
deviation.
C. Comparison of the different estimator
performances
A comparison on how the different estimators perform
with increasing sample size for a vacuum state input is
shown in Fig. 7. The frequentist estimator has a posi-
tive bias leading to an overestimation of the secure ran-
domness rate which can compromise the security of the
random numbers. In contrast, the EVB and both Bayes
estimators have a negative bias which leads to an un-
derestimation of the secure randomness rate. Of all the
estimators, the Bayesian peaked prior estimator is the
most conservative, it will significantly underestimate the
bound even for large sample sizes.
Finally we note that even with an unbiased estimator
for Hmax, one should not take its mean value as the point
estimate. Doing this will lead to a 50% probability of
over estimating Hmax. Instead, one should get a point
estimate based on its confidence interval and a required
failure rate.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We demonstrated a real time source independent
QRNG incorporating measurement basis switching and
hashing using a squeezed state of light as a source of en-
tropy. The protocol was also validated on different ther-
mal states. In the real time demonstration, the sample
size was limited by the finite computational resource. A
valuable lesson learnt from this demonstration is that due
to finite size effects, the frequentist estimator can lead to
an underestimation of the max-entropy due to its biased
nature. This can lead to an underestimation of the ad-
versary’s knowledge on the measured data. To mitigate
9this potential problem, we propose three different ways
for estimation of the max-entropy. Which one of these es-
timators the experimenter picks will depend on his level
of paranoia.
We note that this estimation problem does not arise in
a trusted source QRNG where confidence interval on en-
tropy estimator can be calculated from the knowledge of
the source. Nor does it appear in asymptotic CV quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) protocols where the mea-
sured distribution can be assumed to be Gaussian due
to optimality of Gaussian attacks [63, 64]. For Gaussian
distributions, it is then easy to construct a confidence
interval for the max-entropy. However, in a source inde-
pendent protocol, we see that a Gaussian distribution is
not the best that the adversary can do. Hence assuming
a Gaussian distribution might lead to an underestimation
of her knowledge.
The bit rate was limited by three main factors. First,
the slow real-time hashing of the raw bits which was
done on a desktop computer. Second, the mechanical
beam blocking in check measurement. Third, the limited
squeezing bandwidth. The first limitation can be circum-
vented using a fast programmable gate arrays (FPGA) to
hash. We foresee that implementing the hashing on an
FPGA would allow us to reach the GHz regime [65]. The
second limitation is less stringent since the beam block-
ing only happens during the check-measurement. In our
setup, the check-measurement was performed with a 10%
probability and the data-measurement is not limited by
these slow mechanical beam blocks. Furthermore, one
may use faster, non mechanical ways to block the beam,
for example by using acoustic optical modulators to de-
flect the beams. The third limitation in this experiment
was the squeezing bandwidth which is imposed by the
bandwidth of the OPA squeezing cavity. Hence, using
a squeezed state source may limit the bit rate through
bandwidth limitation more than it improves it through
the higher security rate. This limitation can be cir-
cumvented by using a single pass OPA with would offer
squeezing over much larger bandwidths [66].
In conclusion, we demonstrated a real-time source in-
dependent maximum bit rate of 8.2 kbits per second with
a squeezed state source, and from 5.2 to 7.2 kbits per sec-
ond with thermal source depending on the variance of the
source.
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Appendix A: Extremal distribution for max-entropy
with a fixed variance
Suppose we experimentally observed a discrete distri-
bution in a finite support. From the variance of this dis-
tribution, we can upper bound its entropy. To do that we
shall derive the probability distribution that maximizes
the entropy for a fixed variance. We note that entropy
does not depend on the labels of the bins; to have a
tighter bound we can rearrange the bins to minimize the
variance.
Here we derive the probability distribution maximizing
max-entropy for a fixed variance in a finite support set-
ting. We want to find the extremal distribution P = {pk}
that maximizes the max entropy:
Hmax(~p) = 2 log2
∑
k
√
pk (A1)
over the finite support xk = k δx for integer values k ∈
[−m,m] subject to the normalization constraint∑k pk =
1 and fixed variance condition:
∑
k
pk x
2
k −
(∑
k
pk xk
)2
= V . (A2)
We first show that the extremal distribution must be
symmetric with pk = p−k. From an arbitrary distribu-
tion Q = {qk}, we can construct a symmetrized distribu-
tion P = {pk} with
pk =
qk + q−k
2
.
This distribution will have a smaller variance, var(P) ≤
var(Q) but higher max entropy Hmax(P) ≥ Hmax(Q).
The first statement holds due to 〈Q2〉 = 〈P2〉 and
〈Q〉2 ≥ 〈P〉2 = 0. The second statement follows from
the concavity of the entropy function:
Hmax(P) = 2 log2
∑
k
√
pk
= 2 log2
∑
k
√
qk + q−k
2
≥ 2 log2
∑
k
(
1
2
√
qk +
1
2
√
q−k
)
= Hmax(Q) .
Hence, the extremal distribution is symmetric and has
zero mean.
To find the extremal distribution P, we write the La-
grangian as:
L(P, α, γ) = 2 log2
∑
k
√
pk
+
α
ln 2
(
1−
∑
k
pk
)
+
γ
ln 2
(
V −
∑
k
pk x
2
k
)
.
L attains a stationary point when
∂L
∂pk
= 0
⇒ 1√
pk
1∑
j
√
pj
− α− γ x2k = 0
⇒ 1√
p
k
=
(
α+ γ x2k
)∑
j
√
pj .
Multiplying both sides by pk and summing over k, we
obtain the relation:
α+ γV = 1 .
This together with the constraint ∂L∂α = 0 allows us to
write
pk =
1
(1+γ(x2k−V ))
2∑
j
1
(1+γ(x2j−V ))
2
.
We recognize this as a discretised version of the non-
standardized Student’s t-distribution with 3 degrees of
freedom and standard deviation s:
S3(x; s) =
2
pis
(
1 + x
2
s2
)2 .
When δq → 0 and mδq →∞, we retrieve the continuous
limit, γ → 12 and s2 → V . This is consistent with the
known result that the Student’s t-distribution are the
extremal continuous distribution for Hmax [67].
A necessary condition for the Lagrange multiplier γ
is obtained from the constraint ∂L∂γ = 0 which gives an
implicit equation:∑
k
x2k
(1 + γ(x2k − V ))2
=
∑
j
V(
1 + γ(x2j − V )
)2
⇒
∑
k
x2k − V
(1 + γ(x2k − V ))2
= 0 .
Numerically, we see that there can be more than one
real solution for γ. The extremal Hmax is given by the
solution that is closest to zero.
Appendix B: Small number of bins example
In this Appendix, we show that under extreme cases
when the number of bins is very small, when the number
of samples are very small or when the input state satu-
rates the extreme bins, some of the estimator for Hmax
proposed in the main text may still be negatively biased,
which would lead to a positive bias on Hlow. To illustrate
this we considered three different distributions with only
nine bins as shown in Fig. 8. The only estimator that
shows no negative bias is the peaked prior Bayes estima-
tor.
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Figure 8: Comparison of estimators for Hmax on three probability distributions with just nine bins. A negative bias
on Hmax translates to a positive bias on Hlow. For the Bayesian estimator with peaked prior, K was set to 100.
